Rate of Profit and Income

Distribution i n Relation t o the
Rate of Economic Growth'
One of the most exciting results of the macro-economic theories which have recently been elaborated in Cambridge is a very simple relation connecting the rate of profit and the distribution of income to the rate of economic growth, through the inter-action of the different propensities to save. The interesting aspect of this relation is that-by utilizing the Keynesian concepts of income determination by effective demand and of investment as a variable independent of consumption and savings-it gives a neat and modern content to the deep-rooted old Classical idea of a certain connection between distribution of income and capital accumulation. In this sense, it represents a break with the hundredyear-old tradition of marginal theory, and it is no wonder that it has immediately become the target of attacks and eulogies of such strongly emotional character. Approval and rejection have almost invariably coincided with the commentators' marginalistic or nonmarginalistic view.
The purpose of this paper is to present a more logical reconsideration of the whole theoretical framework, regarded as a system of necessary relations to achieve full employment. A proof will be given that the model, as originally formulated, cannot be maintained. However, once the necessary modifications are introduced, the conclusions which emerge appear much more general and-it seems to me-much more interesting than the authors themselves thought them to be.
A POST-KEYNESIAN THEORY OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND OF THE RATE OF PROFIT
The profit and distribution theory which is common to a number of macro-dynamic models recently elaborated in Cambridge2 has emerged as a development of the Harrod-Domar model of economic growth.' As is well known, all these models are theories of long-run equilibrium. They consider full employment systems where the possibilities of economic growth are externally given by population increase and technical progress. Therefore, the amount of investment-in physical terms -necessary in order to keep full employment through time, is also externally given. The interesting device which has made the analytical formulation of these models so simple and manageable consists in assuming that the externally given possibilities of growth increase at a steady proportional r-ate through time, i.e., according to an exponential function. When this happens, and the corresponding investments are actually carried out, all economic quantities grow in time at the same proportional rate of growth, so that all the ratios among them (investment to income, savings to income, rate of profits, etc.) remain constant. The system expands though keeping all proportions constant. Now, for any given rate of population growth and of (neutral) technical progress2-i.e. for any given natural rate of growth, in Harrod's terminology-there is only one saving ratio which keeps the system in equilibrium growth. This sounds an awkwardly rigid conclusion. But the Cambridge economists have gone on to show that an externally given aggregate saving ratio is not incompatible with independently given individual propensities to save, because the aggregate ratio is simply a weighted average of individual ratios, where the weights represent individual shares in national income. Therefore, within certain limits, there is always a distribution of income at which the system produces the required amount of savings.
On this problem it is useful to follow the neat and simple formulation given by Mr. Kaldor.3 Consider total net income (Y) as divided into two broad categories, wages and profits (W and P); and total net savings as also divided into two categories, workers' savings (Sw) and capitalists' savings (Se), so that
S -Sw + S.
Suppose now simple proportional savings functions S ---s,,W and Sc = s,P (where sw and sc, both being no less than zero and 'no more than unity, and sW # s', represent the propensities to save of the workers and of the capitalists respectively). investment are governed by the possibilities of expansion of the markets.) The condition under which the system will remain in a dynamic equilibrium, namely l= S, Restriction (6) excludes the case of a dynamic equilibrium with a null or negative share of profit, and restriction (7) excludes the case of a dynamic equilibrium with a null or negative share of wages. In practice, if (6) were not satisfied, the system would enter a situation of chronic Keynesian underemployment. Similarly, if (7) were not satisfied the system would enter a situation of chronic inflation. (As a matter of fact the latter limit becomes I operative much before sc even approaches -, because there is a minimum level below which the wage-rate cannot be compressed). It is within these limits that the above model is meant to apply, and that equations (4) and (5) show the existence of a distribution of income and a rate of profit which, through time, will keep the system in equilibrium.
But Mr. Kaldor has gone further. He has pointed out that, if there is in the system a price mechanism by which the level of prices with respect to the money wages (i.e. profit margins) is determined by demand; and if sc > s,,-which after all is implied by (6)-(7) then income distribution (4) and rate of profit (5) will not only exist but also will be the ones that the system actually tends to produce.
A CORRECTION
There is a logical slip, in the theory reported above, which has so far passed unnoticed. The authors have neglected the important fact that, in any type of society, when any individual saves a part of his income, he must also be allowed to own it, otherwise he would not save at all. This means that the stock of capital which exists in the system is owned by those people (capitalists or workers) who in the past made the corresponding savings. And since ownership of capital entitles the owner to a rate of interest, if workers have saved-and thus own a part of the stock of capital (directly or through loans to the capitalists)-then they will also receive a share of the total profits. Therefore total profits themselves must be divided into two categories: profits which accrue to the capitalists and profits which accrue to the workers.
It is this distinction that is missing in the theory just considered. By attributing all profits to the capitalists it has inadvertently but necessarily implied that workers' savings are always totally transferred as a gift to the capitalists. Clearly this is an absurdity. To eliminate it, we must reformulate the model from the beginning and clear up the confusion which has been made of two different concepts of distribution of income: distribution of income between profits and wages, and distribution of income between capitalists and workers. The two concepts only coincide in the particular case in which there is no saving out of wages. As the reader can see, the right hand sides of (8) and (9) exactly coincide with the right hand sides of (4) and (5), but the left hand sides do not. This means that the expressions used so far do not refer to total profits. They only refer to that part of profits which accrue to the capitalists. Let us examine the implications. As far as the distribution theory is concerned, equation (8) still retains a definite, but restricted, meaning. It now only expresses the distribution of income between capitalists and workers. The distribution of income between profits and wages is something different, and to obtain it, one must add the share of workers' profit into income ( y to both sides of equation (8). As to the theory of the rate of profit, the consequences of our reformulation are even more serious. Expression (9) simply represents the ratio of a part of profits (P,) to total capital, but this concept has no useful or interesting meaning. The expression which is really needed is one for the ratio of total profits to total capital (rate of profit), and to obtain it, we must again add a ratio (P) to both sides of equation (9). In other words, we have to find suitable expressions for 
RATE AND SHARE OF PROFITS IN RELATION TO THE RATE OF GROWTH
The most immediate consequence of the reformulation which has just been carried out is that, in order to say anything about share and rate of profits, one needs first a theory of the rate of interest. In a long run equilibrium model, the obvious hypothesis to make is that of a rate of interest equal to the rate of profit. If we do make such a hypothesis, equations (11) The reader will notice that these results are formally similar to those which have been shown in section 1 as particular cases. But now they have been reached without making any assumption whatsoever on the propensities to save of the workers. This is the most striking result of our analysis. It means that, in the long run, workers' propensity to save, though influencing the distribution of income between capitalists and workersequation (8) 
A FUNDAMENTAL RELATION BETWEEN PROFITS AND SAVINGS
The novelty of the conclusion reached in the previous section makes it perhaps worth our while trying to investigate a little more closely the logic behind it.
Let me point out immediately that the model has been built on the institutional principle, inherent in any production system, that wages are distributed among the members of society in proportion to the amount of labour they contribute and profits are distributed in proportion to the amount of capital they own. The latter proposition implies something which has passed unnoticed so far, namely that, in the long run, profits will turn out to be distributed in proportion to the amount of savings which are contributed. In other words, no matter how many categories of individuals we may consider, in a long run exponential growth, the ratio of the profits that each category receives to the savings that it provides will always be the same for all categories. In our model:
This indeed sets a proportionality relation between profits and savings which is fundamental to the whole problem of profits and distribution. It means that, for each category, profits are in the long run proportional to savings. Let me stress that this relation does not depend on any behavioural assumption whatsoever; it simply and logically follows from the institutional principle that profits are distributed in proportion to ownership of capital. This principle, however, still leaves the actual value of ratio (16) indeterminate, as it only requires that this ratio be the same for all categories. It is at this point that the particular types of income out of which savings are made become relevant. If there is in the system a category of individuals who-owing to the position they occupy in the production process-derive all their incomes, and therefore savings, exclusively from profits, the saving behaviour of just this group of individuals will set up, independently of (16), another and more definite relation between savings and profits. The only way in which this new behavioural relation can be compatible with (16) is for it to determine the actual value of the ratio of profits to savings for the whole system. We can see this immediately by substituting our saving functions into (16). We obtain Pw Pc s,(W + Pw) scpc which may also be written in either of the two following ways: 
These expressions now allow us some insight into the reason why workers' propensity to save does not, and capitalists' propensity to save does, play a role in determining total profits. Expression (17) says that, in the long run, when workers save, they receive an amount of profits (Pw) such as to make their total savings exactly equal to the amount that the capitalists would have saved out of workers' profits (Pw) if these profits remained to them. Expression (18) is even more explicit. Savings out of wages always turn out to be equal to workers' extra consumption out of profits (extra consumption meaning consumption in excess of what the capitalists would have consumed if those profits remained to them). Another way of interpreting these results is to say that whatever workers' propensity to save (sw) may be, there is always a distribution of income and a distribution of profits which makes the ratio s( P ) equal to any pre-determined ratio PW Or, to look at the problem the other way round, for any given sw, there are infinite proportions between profits and savings which can be used in (16) saying that, on the part of the workers, the rate of profit is indeterminate. They will always receive, in the long run, an amount of profits proportional to their savings, whatever the rate of profit may be.
The situation is entirely different when we consider the capitalists. The fact that all capitalists' savings come out of profits sets a straight relation between savings and profits. No other variable enters into it, in contrast with the previous case where the wage share was also in the picture. It follows that, for any given sc, there is only one proportionality relation between profits and savings-this relation being required by (16)-which can .PC PC also make the ratio p equal to SC This proportionality relation can be nothing but sc, which will therefore determine the ratio of profits to savings for all the saving groups, and consequently also the income distribution between profits and wages and the rate of interest for the whole system. The reader may complete his view of the problem by thinking for a moment of the practically irrelevant but interesting case, in which capitalists' profits are nil (i.e. Pc = 0). In this case, the behavioural relation (sCPL) determining the rate of profit drops out of the picture altogether and the rate of profit becomes indeterminate. (The parameter sw, which remains, cannot determine the rate of profit!) We have met this case already in the process of finding K in section 4, where non-fulfilment of (13) would exactly imply Pc = 0 and an indeterminate rate of profit.
IMPLICATIONS
We may now synthesize the implications of the foregoing analysis in two conclusions. First of all, the irrelevance of workers' propensity to save gives the model a much wider generality than was hitherto believed. Since the rate of profit and the income distribution between profits and wages are determined independently of s, there is no need for any hypothesis whatever on the aggregate savings behaviour of the workers. The non-capitalists might well be divided into any number of sub-categories one likes; the subdivision might even be carried as far as to consider single individuals; yet equations (14)- (15) would not change. Of course the particular behaviour of the sub-categories or single individuals would influence the distribution of income among the various workers, and between the workers and the capitalists, as equation (8) shows. But the distribution of income between total wages and total profits, and the rate of profit would remain exactly the same. Secondly, the relevance of the capitalists' propensity to save, which is the only one to appear in the final formulae (14) and (15), uncovers the absolutely strategic importance for the whole system of the decisions to save of just one group of individuals: the capitalists. The particular saving function of this group transforms the open proportionality relation (16) into a definite function in which the proportion that profits must bear to savings in the wt/hole system, is given by the saving propensity of one single category of individuals., The similar decisions to save of all the other individuals, the workers, do not count in this respect. Whatever the workers may do, they can only share in an amount of total profits which for them is predetermined; they have no power to influence it at all. These conclusions, as the reader may clearly realise, now suddenly shed new light on the old Classical idea, hinted at already at the beginning, of a relation between the savings of that group of individuals who are in the position to carry on the process of production and the process of capital accumulation. This idea has always persisted in economic literature but in a vague and muddled form. Economists have never been able to bring it out clearly. In particular they have always thought-and the post-Keynesian theories 1 It may be useful to remind the reader that the whole analysis refers to states of long-run equilibrium. The relevant behavioural process must not necessarily be looked for in association with particular physical persons, bLut rather in association with specific kinds of decisions: those concerning savings out of profits as such. it must, moreover, be noticed that in a modern economic system, where large corporations have a certain autonomous power to retain profits, the profit retention ratios of the corporations and the individuLals' propensities to save out of (distribLuted) profits add up. examined in section 1 seemed to confirm-that the relation between capitalists' savings and capital accumulation depended on particularly simplifying and drastic assumptions about negligible savings by the workers. The novelty of the present analysis has been to show that the relation is valid independently of any of those assumptions. It is valid whatever the saving behaviour of the workers may be.
THE CONDITIONS OF STABILITY
Our analysis would be incomplete if, after showing that there exists a distribution of income between profits and wages which keeps the system in long run equilibrium, we did not also specify the limits within which such distribution has economic meaning and the conditions under which it is stable.
On this problem we may recall the discussion that Mr. Kaldor has carried out already. The limits (6) and (7) of section 1 must here be confirmed. Moreover, we must confirm that if there is in the system a price mechanism by which the level of prices with respect to the level of wages (profit margins) rises or falls according as to whether demand exceeds or falls short of supply, and if equilibrium investments are actually carried out, then the system is stable. For it will tend to get back to its dynamic equilibrium path whenever displaced from it.
But we are now in a position to examine these problems in a much better way. The propositions stated above may be expressed as follows: 
K Sc "The equilibrium rate of profit is determined by the natural rate of growth divided by the capitalists' propensity to save; independently of anything else in the model. This basic relation is confirmed. Therefore, the link between (14) and (15) that the extra technical equation (1') has introduced, can only go one way. Since it cannot influence the rate of profit, it can only contribute to determining the investment-income ratio. In this way the equilibrium amount of investment is uniquely and exogenously determined. All this means that the foregoing analysis has singled out one of those asymmetrical chains of relations to which in science the concept of causality is associated. This causality chain may here be expressed as follows. The externally given rate of population growth and the capitalists' propensity to save determine first of all the rate of profit. At this rate of profit, the optimum technique is chosen (in such a way as to satisfy the marginal productivity conditions). Then, the optimum technique, together with the rate of population growth, uniquely determine the equilibrium investment-income ratio. In this system, therefore, technical relation (I') simply comes to determine one more variable-the equilibrium quantity of capital."
We may first consider an intermediate step. In the short run, the share of profits which accrue to the workers is fixed, as it takes time for the rate of interest to adapt itself This is exactly the stability condition given by Mr. Kaldor. The above analysis proves that it is only a short-run condition.
But let us consider the long run, when the share of workers' profits is no longer fixed and PW adapts itself to a proportion of KW equal to the proportion that P, bears to K,. By substitution from (18), condition (21) simply becomes
This is all that is required. We may conclude that, in a system where full employment investments are actually carried out, and prices are flexible with respect to wages, the only condition for stability is sc > 0, a condition which is certainly and abundantly satisfied even outside the limits in which the mathematical model has an economic meaning.
THE CASE OF A SOCIALIST SYSTEM
Going back now to our basic model, the reader will notice how few, after all, are the assumptions which have been used. These assumptions become even fewer if we consider the case of a socialist system. In a socialist society, all the members of the community belong to the category of workers. There is no place for capitalists; the responsibility for carrying on the production process and the direct ownership of all means of production are taken over by the State. However, the State, as such, cannot consume: consumption can be carried out only by individuals. Therefore, if any amount of the national product is not distributed to the members of the community, either as wages or as interest on their loans to the State, that amount is ipso facto saved. This means that the parameter sV becomes unity (s,. = 1), as an inherent property of the system; so that even the one behavioural parameter that still remained in our final formulae, disappears.
Equations (14) and (15) An explanation can be given by following the same procedure used in section 5, which here becomes even simpler. By putting sc 1 in (18), the interesting property immediately emerges that, in a dynamic equilibrium, individual savings out of wages are exactly equal to individual consumption out of interest; so that total consumption (out of wages and out of interests) turns out to be equal to total wages.
The important corollary that follows is that there is no need for a socialist State to exert any interference whatsoever in individual decisions to consume and to save. Only one limit must be respected, a limit which is the same encountered in the case of a capitalist system and expressed by inequality (6). The community, as a whole, cannot remain in equilibrium if it insists in saving more than what is required by the natural rate of growth; if it did, the system would fall into a situation of chronic under-employment due to lack of effective demand.' Provided that this limit is not overcome, no restriction need be put on individual savings. The only effect of these savings is to require from the State the issuing of a national debt for a part of the stock of capital, and the consequent distribution of a part of profits, which will however come back under the form of lent savings.
To conclude, we may put these results in the following way. In a full employment economic system in which all net revenues that accrue to the organizers of the process of production are saved, there exists one particular rate of interest, which we may indeed call the natural rate of interest-since it turns out to be equal to the natural rate of growthwhich has the following property. If it is applied both in the process of pricing and in the payment of interest on loans, it causes the system, whatever the individual decisions to save may be, to produce a total amount of savings which is exactly equal to the amount of investment needed to cope with technical progress and population growth. There are two different problems raised by this question. The first one concerns aggregation. It must be noticed that the foregoing investigation is not " macro-economic" in the sense of representing a first simplified rough step towards a more detailed and disaggregated analysis. It is macro-economic because it could not be otherwise. Only problems have been discussed which are of a macro-economic nature; an accurate investigation of them has nothing to do with disaggregation. They would remain the same-i.e. they would still arise at a macro-economic level-even if we were to break down the model into a disaggregated analysis, and therefore introduce the necessary additional information (or assumptions) about consumers' choice of goods and producers' choice of techniques. I might add that in fact, the present paper has originated from a multi-sector growth model, on which I have been working for some time, and whose results have turned out to be incompatible with the post-Keynesian theories examined in section 1.
A second and separate problem concerns the interpretative value of the model. When Mr. Kadlor presented his theory of income distribution, he pointed out that the interpretative value of the theory depends on the Keynesian hypotheses on which it is built. In particular it depends on the crucial hypothesis (post-Keynesian rather than Keynesian) that investment can be treated as an independent variable governed by technical progress and population growth.
But this is not the approach that I should like to take here. Whether we are or whether we are not prepared to accept the model in this behavioural sense, there are important practical implications which are valid in any case. I should look, therefore, at the previous analysis simply and more generally as a logical framework to answer interesting questions about what ought to happen if full employment is to be kept over time, more than as a behavioural theory expressing what actually happens.
The case of a socialist systerm, which came last in our analysis, is the most straightforward on this respect. The amount of investments that must be undertaken in order to maintain full employment-once this has been reached-is indeed that which is required by technical progress and population growth. And if these investments are carried out, the rate of profit (when uniformly applied) must be equal to the natural rate of growth, if total demand is to be such as to allow the full utilization of the productive capacity and of the labour force. These results do not depend on any behavioural assumption whatsoever. They are true whatever individual behaviour may be; as a simple matter of logical necessity.
In the case of a capitalist system, the additional problem arises of whether the capitalists will or will not spontaneously undertake the amount of investments necessary to cope with the natural possibilities of growth. We may of course discuss at length in this case the circumstances under which equilibrium will or will not be automatically reached. But again we should not let these discussions obscure the conclusions, which are valid in any case, about the relations that must be satisfied if full employment is to be kept. If full employment is to be maintained, that amount of investment must be undertaken. And if it is undertaken; there is-for any given proportion of capitalists' income which tends to be saved'-only one rate of profit, i.e. one distribution of income between profits and wages, that keeps the system on the dynamic path of full employment. This, it seems to me, is the relevant way to look at the model which has been elaborated above. The whole analysis has been carried out with constant reference to a situation of full employment because full employment is the situation that matters, and that indeed, now-a-days, forms one of the agreed goals of any economic system. The conclusions, therefore, acquire an important practical relevance whether the system is automatically able to reach full employment or whether it is not. In the latter case, I should say that they become even more important, because it is then that practical measures have to be taken and it becomes essential to have clear ideas about the direction in which to move. Cambridge.
LUIGI L. PASINETTI
Let me point out that, in this context, the objection so commonly advanced against the theory formulated in section 1--namely, that to classify the members of a modern society in only two groups is an arbitrary and crude simplification-entirely loses its ground. The central outcome of the previous analysis has just been to show that, as far as the determination of the rate of profit is concerned, the distinction between individuals who save exclusively oLt of profits and individuajls who save out of wages is the only one that matters.
